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Failing to Protect Public Employees’ First Amendment
Rights: The Need for a Presumption of Public Concern for
Truthful Testimony
I. Introduction
The law requires people to make difficult decisions from time to time,
but public employees face a uniquely troubling choice regarding their First
Amendment rights and their ability to testify truthfully in a court
proceeding without fear of retaliation. Jerud Butler experienced this
scenario firsthand when his sister-in-law called him to testify as a character
witness in a child custody hearing.1 When confronted with the predicament,
Butler chose what should be the correct option for the health of the justice
system—he testified truthfully. 2 Unfortunately, this choice resulted in
Butler’s employer demoting him, highlighting the serious concerns with a
system that creates an unwinnable scenario for many public employees who
are subpoenaed to testify in a court proceeding. 3 If called to testify, public
employees like Butler have three options, none of which are void of serious
problems.4 Public employees can testify truthfully and risk employer
retaliation, refuse to testify by ignoring a subpoena and be in contempt of
court, or commit perjury by lying on the stand to avoid adverse
employment action.5
This Note examines the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Butler v.
Board of County Commissioners and the implications of its rejection of a
per se rule for truthful testimony, as well as its failure to adequately protect
such speech. Part II explores important Court decisions on First
Amendment rights for public employees, including Pickering v. Board of
Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos. Specifically, this
section analyzes how these opinions created the modern balancing test for
public employee speech. Part III discusses the circuit split in how courts
have applied the Garcetti/Pickering test regarding truthful testimony as a
matter of public concern. Part IV provides an overview of Butler and
explains the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in this case. Part V discusses the
implications of the Butler decision and its impact on First Amendment
1. See Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don’t: A Public Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 623, 623 (2011).
5. Id.
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jurisprudence. This section also argues that due to the importance of
truthful testimony for the justice system, circuit courts that reject a per se
rule should recognize a rebuttable presumption that truthful testimony is a
matter of public concern. Along with this presumption, courts should
implement a broader interpretation of public concern to include topics such
as testimony in child custody cases, in which child welfare is a public
concern.
II. Law Before Butler
A. First Amendment Protection for Public Employees: Pickering/Connick
Test
The Supreme Court has “uniformly rejected” the notion that public
employees relinquish all First Amendment rights and may be “subject to
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable” simply because public
employment is a choice. 6 However, before the 1960s, there existed a
pervasive “unchallenged dogma” that public employees “had no right to
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”7 Justice Holmes
exemplified this widespread belief in a Massachusetts Supreme Court case,
commenting, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” 8
In 1968 the Supreme Court shifted away from the notion that public
employees had virtually no First Amendment protections against employer
retaliation and restrictions on free speech. 9 With this evolution of thought
around First Amendment rights for public employees, the Court continued
to recognize a state’s unique and important interest in regulating its
employees’ speech as distinct from its interest in the speech of the general
citizenry. 10 However, the Court also acknowledged that public employees
retain some First Amendment rights, notwithstanding their employment
choices. 11 Thus, the Court aimed to balance the citizen employee’s interests
6. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)).
7. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (holding that public employees may have a right to free speech, but
they have “no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms”).
8. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892).
9. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
10. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
11. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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“in commenting upon matters of public concern” with the state employer’s
interests “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”12
The Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Pickering significantly
reshaped and expanded the historical understanding of public employees’
First Amendment rights to free speech. 13 In that case, Marvin L. Pickering
claimed his employer violated his First Amendment rights by firing him
from his position as a high school teacher after he sent a letter to a local
newspaper.14 In this letter, he criticized a “recently proposed tax increase”
and how the Board of Education and district superintendent had “handled
past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools.”15
To afford public employees some First Amendment protection, the Court
rejected the Board of Education’s position that truthful comments on
matters of public concern “may furnish grounds for dismissal if they are
sufficiently critical in tone.”16 According to the Court, Pickering’s letter
was about a matter of public concern because it addressed the issue of
“whether a school system require[d] additional funds.”17 Moreover, this
type of question is such that “free and open debate is vital,” and teachers
are “the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions” about the allocation of school funds. 18 In balancing the interests
of both parties, the Court concluded that Pickering’s letter neither interfered
with his daily job duties nor impeded the “operation of the schools
generally.”19 The school board, therefore, did not have a greater interest in
limiting its employee’s “opportunities to contribute to public debate” than it
did regarding any member of the public. 20 Thus, the Court held the First
Amendment protected Pickering’s letter. 21
Years later, the Court in Connick v. Myers elaborated on how to apply
the Pickering decision, adding another consideration in the balancing test
for public employees’ First Amendment rights. 22 Accordingly, the Court
held that First Amendment protection for public employees only extends to
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Jasperse, supra note 4, at 627.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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“speech on a matter of public concern.” 23 In Connick, Sheila Myers, a New
Orleans assistant district attorney, responded to an unwanted department
transfer by distributing a questionnaire to her colleagues concerning office
policies about transfers, employee morale, and the confidence levels that
employees had in their supervisors.24 Myers’s supervisor, Connick, then
fired her because her distribution of the questionnaire was an “act of
insubordination.”25
The Court held that Myers’s questionnaire, with the exception of one
question, was not on a matter of public concern, but rather about a “single
employee . . . upset with the status quo.” 26 In coming to this conclusion, the
Court provided some guidance for analyzing what falls under the realm of
public concern.27 When employee speech does not relate to a “matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community,” public employers
should have broad discretion in “managing their offices[] without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary.”28 Specifically, courts must consider the
“content, form, and context of a given statement” to determine whether
speech is of public concern. 29 In 2014, the Court once again mandated this
case-by-case approach originally introduced in Connick.30
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Pursuant to Official Duties Standard
The Supreme Court expanded the Pickering/Connick analysis when it
revisited First Amendment protections for public employees in Garcetti v.
Ceballos in 2006.31 In this case, Richard Ceballos, a Los Angeles County
deputy district attorney, faced “a series of retaliatory employment actions” 32
after he wrote a memo and testified that an affidavit for a search warrant
“contained serious misrepresentations.”33 Ceballos argued that the First
Amendment protected his speech in the memo. 34 The Ninth Circuit agreed,
23. Id.
24. Id. at 140–41.
25. Id. at 141.
26. Id. at 148.
27. See id. at 146.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 147–48.
30. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014) (holding that the public concern
inquiry “turns on the ‘content, form, and context’ of the speech”).
31. Ashley M. Cross, Law Summary, The Right to Remain Silent? Garcetti v. Ceballos
and a Public Employee’s Refusal to Speak Falsely, 77 MO. L. REV. 805, 808 (2012).
32. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006).
33. Id. at 414.
34. Id. at 415.
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holding that his memo about perceived “governmental misconduct” was a
matter of public concern. 35
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and created
another step in the analysis. In addition to determining whether the speech
at issue is of public concern, courts must also consider whether the
employee’s speech “was uttered as an employee or as a citizen,” with the
First Amendment protecting only citizen speech.36 The Court explained that
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,”
they are speaking as employees rather than citizens, so the “Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”37 This
distinction is important because restraining employee speech created in the
context of one’s professional duties does not limit the employee’s First
Amendment rights as a private citizen. 38 Therefore, because Ceballos wrote
the memo as a part of his employment responsibilities, the First
Amendment did not safeguard his speech or protect him from adverse
employment action.39
C. The Garcetti/Pickering Test
Following the Supreme Court’s opinions in Pickering, Connick, and
Garcetti, courts now apply a five-part inquiry—often referred to as the
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test—for First Amendment issues relating to
public employee speech.40 When analyzing whether the First Amendment
protects a public employee’s speech, courts consider:
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s
official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public
concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to
outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the
protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse
employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have

35. Id. at 416.
36. Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware: New Limits on Public Employees’ Speech, 11 DEL.
L. REV. 23, 26 (2009).
37. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
38. Id. at 421–22.
39. Id. at 422.
40. See Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019); Bailey v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2018).
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reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
protected conduct.41
Courts have taken different approaches in applying the
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test, specifically regarding which speech rises
to the level of public concern and whether courtroom testimony deserves a
per se rule automatically designating it a matter of public concern. 42 In
circuits that have adopted such a rule, the second factor is always satisfied
for sworn testimony, and thus, the analysis turns on whether the other
factors are met. 43
III. Circuit Split
A. Circuits Adopting a Per Se Rule: Fifth and Third
Two circuits have adopted a per se rule that public employees’ truthful
testimony is a matter of public concern. 44 The Fifth Circuit was the first to
adopt such a rule in Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District.45 In
that case, Carl Johnston worked for the Harris County Flood Control
District (“HCFD”) as a supervisor for many years before he testified at an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearing on behalf of a fellow
employee. 46 Following his testimony, which was “not favorable to HCFD
and its directors,” Johnston faced a “series of retaliatory employment
actions.”47 His employer ultimately fired him for refusing to accept a
demotion, prompting him to bring suit against HCFD.48
In addressing whether Johnston’s testimony at the hearing was on a
matter of public concern, the court held that “[w]hen an employee testifies
before an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks
in a context that is inherently of public concern.”49 The court attributed its
decision to adopt a per se rule for truthful testimony to the importance of
41. Butler, 920 F.3d at 655.
42. Compare Latessa v. N.J. Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that truthful testimony in a court proceeding is a matter of public concern deserving
First Amendment protection); with Butler, 920 F.3d at 660 (declining to adopt a per se rule
that sworn testimony is always a matter of public concern).
43. See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996).
44. See, e.g., Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997); Johnston v.
Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989).
45. See Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.
46. Id. at 1568.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1578.
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uninhibited, honest testimony in bolstering the fact-finding function of the
judicial system. 50
The Third Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in adopting a per se rule for
truthful testimony seven years later in Pro v. Donatucci.51 Pro, a public
employee, filed suit against her supervisor, Donatucci, after he fired her for
complying with a subpoena and appearing to testify on behalf of
Donatucci’s wife in a divorce proceeding. 52 Even though Pro was never
actually called to testify as a witness, she alleged that Donatucci fired her
for simply appearing in court as a potential witness. 53 The court held that
Pro’s speech (appearing in court to testify) was inherently a matter of public
concern in its “form and context—that is, potential ‘sworn testimony before
an adjudicatory body’” despite its content being about a private matter. 54
Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that the per se rule for subpoenaed
testimony established in Pro also applies to voluntary courtroom testimony
because the same policy rationale behind adopting a per se rule for
compelled testimony is present in both circumstances. 55
B. Circuits Rejecting a Per Se Rule: Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Four circuits have rejected a per se rule that truthful testimony
automatically qualifies as a matter of public concern. 56 The Fourth Circuit
was the first to reject such a rule in Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore.57 In that case, Stephen Arvinger, a school police officer, sued the
Department of Education after his employer fired him for speaking to
investigators about a sex-discrimination suit filed by a female co-worker
(Diane Diggs). 58 When analyzing whether the First Amendment protected
Avinger’s statements to investigators, the court clarified that a statement
50. Id.
51. See 81 F.3d 1283, 1290–91 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth.,
105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In Pro, we held the context of a courtroom appearance
raises speech to a level of public concern, regardless of its content.”).
52. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1285.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1288 (quoting Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).
55. Green, 105 F.3d at 886 (holding that both compelled and voluntary testimony
deserve First Amendment protection to promote the “integrity of the truth-seeking process”).
56. See Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988);
Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); Padilla
v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 1999); Maggio v. Sipple, 211
F.3d 1346, 1352–54 (11th Cir. 2000).
57. 862 F.2d at 79.
58. Id. at 76–77.
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about private interests which is “otherwise devoid of public concern,” does
not satisfy the Pickering test.59 The court vehemently rejected a per se rule
by holding that it is “irrelevant for [F]irst [A]mendment purposes that the
statement was made in the course of an official hearing.” 60 Because
Arvinger’s statement “was made solely to further the interests of Mr.
Arvinger and Ms. Diggs” and not to “further the public debate on
employment discrimination” or another topic of public concern, the
statement was not protected despite being part of an official hearing. 61 The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits similarly rejected a blanket rule that truthful
testimony is always a matter of public concern.62
The Seventh Circuit similarly rejected a per se rule “according absolute
First Amendment protection” to sworn testimony in Wright v. Illinois
Department of Children & Family Services.63 But unlike the Fourth Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit did acknowledge the unique importance of protecting
such testimony. 64 Thus, the court sought to safeguard this type of employee
speech using the third prong of the Garcetti/Pickering test,65 which
considers “whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s
free speech interests.”66 Despite not adopting a per se rule for courtroom
testimony, the Wright court explained that an employee called to testify in a
court proceeding has a “compelling interest in testifying truthfully,” such
that an “employer can have an offsetting interest in preventing her from
doing so only in the rarest of cases.” 67
59. Id. at 79.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a teacher’s testimony about the propriety of a hypothetical sexual relationship
between a student and a teacher was not on a matter of public concern); Maggio v. Sipple,
211 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee’s testimony in an
administrative grievance hearing for a fellow employee was not of public concern because
the purpose of her testimony was not to “raise issues of public concern,” but rather “to
support the grievance of her supervisor” and “curry the favor” of her supervisor for her own
benefit).
63. 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. See id. (explaining that the Court “share[s] [its] colleagues’ concern for the integrity
of the judicial process”). But see Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the fact that a statement was made during an official hearing is
“irrelevant for [F]irst [A]mendment purposes”).
65. See Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505.
66. Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019).
67. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505.
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IV. Statement of the Case
A. The Tenth Circuit Joins the Circuit Split in Butler
In Butler, the Tenth Circuit weighed in on the debate surrounding First
Amendment rights for public employees and whether truthful testimony is
per se a matter of public concern.68 The court considered how other circuits
have ruled on this issue and the various arguments that led to the current
circuit split.69 In deciding the Butler case, the Tenth Circuit declined to
adopt a per se rule designating truthful testimony as a matter of public
concern, joining the four other circuit courts that have also rejected such a
rule. 70
B. Facts
Butler arose after Jerud Butler’s employer disciplined him for testifying
in court.71 Butler worked for the San Miguel County Road and Bridge
Department. 72 His employer offered to promote him to a district supervisor
position on September 1, 2016.73 Six days after he accepted the promotion,
however, “Butler testified in a child custody hearing in Montrose
County . . . involving his sister-in-law and her ex-husband, who [was] also
an employee of the San Miguel County, Road and Bridge Department.” 74
Though Butler voluntarily testified as a character witness at his sister-inlaw’s request, the court would have subpoenaed his testimony had he
refused to testify.75
During his testimony, Butler truthfully answered questions about “the
hours of operation for the San Miguel County Road and Bridge
Department . . . based upon his own personal knowledge.”76 Following this
testimony, two County Directors “conducted an investigation into Butler’s
testimony” at the custody hearing and subsequently issued Butler a
“Written Reprimand and demotion.”77

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Butler, 920 F.3d at 657
Id. at 658–61.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 15, Butler, 920 F.3d 651 (No. 17-cv-00577)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 74, ¶¶ 18–19).
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 74, ¶ 23).
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C. Procedural History and Issue
After his employers retaliated against him because of his testimony at the
custody hearing, Butler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
County Directors who conducted the investigation and demoted him. 78 In
his lawsuit, Butler alleged the County Directors violated his “right to free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by demoting him for
testifying truthfully at the custody hearing.”79 The district court granted the
County Directors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, reasoning that “Butler had
failed to allege a First Amendment violation because his triggering speech
was not on a matter of public concern.”80
Butler challenged that decision by filing an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. 81
On appeal, the court reviewed the issue of whether truthful testimony is per
se a matter of public concern, and if not, whether Butler’s testimony was on
a matter of public concern.82
D. Decision
In Butler, the Tenth Circuit joined the circuits that have rejected a per se
rule for truthful testimony as a matter of public concern.83 In doing so, the
court applied the Garcetti/Pickering balancing test to determine whether
Butler’s testimony in the custody hearing was protected First Amendment
speech.84 Because the County Directors conceded Butler testified as a
private citizen, not pursuant to his official employment duties, Butler’s
testimony satisfied the first prong of the balancing test.85 As a result, the
court primarily focused on the second inquiry—“whether the speech was on
a matter of public concern.”86 After concluding that Butler’s testimony was
not of public concern, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the case without addressing the remaining three prongs of the
test.87

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
2018)).
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 655.
Id.
See id. (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir.
See id. at 664–65.
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1. Rejecting a Per Se Rule of Public Concern for Sworn Testimony
The court rejected Butler’s argument that courts should always designate
sworn testimony as a matter of public concern, stating that the Supreme
Court has “mandated a case-by-case approach.”88 Thus, the court opted to
follow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Connick and Lane v. Franks,
considering the “content, form and context” of public employee speech or
testimony to determine if it is of public concern.89
The court supported its decision to follow a case-by-case approach in
lieu of a per se rule for truthful testimony by relying on the Supreme
Court’s discussion of public employee speech in the form of sworn
testimony in Lane.90 Following a circuit split in how courts determine
whether testimonial speech is of public concern, the Lane Court provided
guidance. Specifically, it acknowledged that when considering the form and
context of a public employee’s speech, whether the speech is sworn
testimony is “a factor to consider” that often fortifies a finding that the
speech is of public concern, but is not dispositive, rendering a per se rule
“inappropriate.”91 According to Tenth Circuit, Lane indicates that content
remains a relevant inquiry for determining whether public employee speech
is of public concern, even when the form of the speech is sworn testimony
in a judicial proceeding. 92
The court cited previous Tenth Circuit cases which used a case-by-case
approach for analyzing courtroom testimony. 93 In Bailey v. Independent
School District Number 69, the court performed a content, form, and
context analysis to determine whether a public employee’s letter “seeking a
reduced sentence for his relative” was of public concern.94 Though the
Tenth Circuit had never “expressly considered” adopting a per se rule
rendering all sworn testimony by public employees a matter of public
concern, its application of a case-by-case approach in past cases provided
yet another basis for the official rejection of a per se rule in Butler.95
88. Id. at 657.
89. Id. at 658 (first citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and then citing Lane
v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014)).
90. See id. at 657–58.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 658.
93. See, e.g., id. (discussing Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1179
(10th Cir. 2018)); see also id. at 662 (citing Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706,
713–14 (10th Cir. 1989)).
94. Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1179.
95. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 662–63.
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The Butler court acknowledged the circuit split about sworn testimony
before the Supreme Court issued the Lane opinion and maintained that the
conflicting circuit opinions strengthened its decision to reject a per se rule
for courtroom testimony.96 In doing so, the court appreciated the Fifth and
Third Circuit’s reasoning in adopting a per se rule for truthful testimony
and the desire to protect the “integrity of the truth-seeking functions of
courts.”97 However, it maintained that the purpose of the Garcetti/Pickering
test is not to “protect[] the integrity” of the justice system, but rather to
determine if “the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech.” 98
The court insisted that there are other sufficient processes in place designed
to uphold the “truth-seeking function” of the court system, such as
“subpoena and contempt powers, cross-examination, and criminal sanctions
for perjury.”99
2. Holding That Butler’s Testimony Was Not of Public Concern
After rejecting a per se rule for sworn testimony, the Tenth Circuit also
held that Butler’s testimony in the custody hearing was not on a matter of
public concern. 100 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the
purpose of the speech and whether it simply dealt with “personal disputes
and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.”101 The court determined
that Butler’s motive for testifying was for personal reasons rather than for
reasons “involving impropriety or malfeasance of government officials” or
any other reason that would bring the testimony into the “realm of public
concern.”102 Because Butler’s testimony centered on a personal matter,
which is typically not of interest to the community at large, the court did
not view his speech as a matter of public concern. 103
By determining Butler’s testimony was not of public concern, the Tenth
Circuit rejected Butler’s argument that the state’s interest in child welfare
and the fair adjudication of child custody disputes rendered his speech of
public interest.104 Accordingly, the court stated that Colorado’s general
interest in child welfare and custody matters did not automatically make
96. Id. at 660.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 663.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69,
896 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2018)).
102. Id. at 664.
103. Id. at 663–64.
104. Id. at 664.
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speech on such topics matters of public concern worthy of First
Amendment protections.105 Even if the topic of the speech is of interest to
the general public, “what is actually said must meet the public concern
threshold” as well.106 The specific content of Butler’s testimony largely
pertained to his sister-in-law’s character and the County Road and Bridge
Department’s operating hours, which the court said failed to meet the public
concern threshold for protected First Amendment speech.107
The court distinguished Butler’s testimony from the speech at issue in
Wright, a case in which the Seventh Circuit determined that a social
worker’s testimony about the state’s “methods of investigating an allegation
of child abuse” was of public concern because it “address[ed] serious
systematic deficiencies in the operation of a public department” and was
therefore of great interest to the community at large. 108 Thus, the speech in
Wright did not reach the level of public concern simply because it was
testimony in a child custody proceeding.109 Rather, its content about the
“procedural and substantive shortcomings” in the public department’s
operation rendered the speech of public interest, unlike Butler’s testimony,
which the court considered largely personal in nature.110
V. Implications and Shortcomings of Butler
While the Butler court correctly rejected a per se rule for sworn
testimony in light of Supreme Court precedent,111 the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis of the content, form, and context of Butler’s speech at the custody
hearing negatively impacts the health of the justice system and places
public employees in an unfair position.112 Although it acknowledged that
the form and context of public employee speech in courtroom testimony
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir.
2015)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children &
Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505–06 (7th Cir. 1994)).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Wright, 40 F.3d at 1502).
111. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014) (“The inquiry turns on the ‘content,
form, and context’ of the speech.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48)
(1983))); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“[N]o factor is dispositive, and it is
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech.”).
112. See Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he integrity
of the judicial process would be damaged if we were to permit unchecked retaliation for . . .
truthful testimony.”).
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“weigh in favor of treating it as a matter of public concern,”113 the court
largely considered content alone in deciding Butler’s testimony was not of
public concern.114 By not properly weighing the importance of form and
context, but primarily—if not solely—considering the content of Butler’s
speech, the court “violate[d] the very Supreme Court mandate [it] claim[ed]
to honor in rejecting a per se rule.”115 Courts can and should place a high
value on truthful testimony and seek to protect this speech in ways that are
consistent with First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, courts should
adopt a rebuttable presumption that sworn testimony in a judicial
proceeding is of public concern.
A. A Rebuttable Presumption of Public Concern for Sworn Testimony
A presumption of public concern for sworn testimony is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s assertion that the context and form of in-court
testimony “fortif[ies]” the conclusion that such speech is a matter of public
concern.116 Courtroom testimony is unique in its formality, gravity, and
ability to impress upon a witness that “his or her statements will be the
basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights
and liberties of others.”117 These Supreme Court statements clearly support
a significant presumption that testimony under oath is not solely a private
matter.118 A public concern presumption for sworn testimony encapsulates
the value of witness testimony in the judicial process and the public’s
inherent interest in such testimony. 119
Because the fear of employer discipline or retaliation “undermines a
witness’ willingness to testify,” it is vital to analyze truthful testimony
under the rebuttable presumption that it is of public concern.120 Insufficient
protection of public employee testimony hinders the accuracy and
effectiveness of the judicial system by fostering an environment in which
witnesses may not feel safe to testify wholly and truthfully. 121 Moreover,
113. Butler, 920 F.3d at 663.
114. See id. at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 241.
117. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012).
118. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 669 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
119. See Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir.
1989) (concluding that the importance of testimony for the judicial system is sufficient to
render speech in that context of public concern).
120. Butler, 920 F.3d at 666 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
121. Joseph Deloney, Note, Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 709, 711 (2016).
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the consequences for refusing to testify or testifying untruthfully to avoid
employer retaliation are far too grave to unnecessarily impose upon
employees.122 It is unfair for courts to put public employees in the
“impossible position” of either risking “substantial penalties, including
incarceration” if they neglect the duty to testify truthfully, or risking
significant adverse employment consequences if they comply with the
duty. 123 Therefore, courts should make a serious effort to afford First
Amendment protection to sworn testimony for public employees to the
extent that Supreme Court precedent allows. Implementing a rebuttable
presumption of public concern for truthful testimony is the best way to
adequately protect public employees’ First Amendment rights without
ignoring the Court’s mandate for a case-by-case approach. 124
A rebuttable presumption that sworn testimony is of public concern
would not preclude public employers from successfully arguing that
employee testimony is wholly on a private matter if it is one of the few
situations in which that may be the case. Furthermore, even with a
presumption that would treat most truthful testimony as a matter of public
concern, the government could still prevail on the third prong of the
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test by showing that its interests “in
promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the
plaintiff’s free speech interests.”125 In balancing these interests, employers
must show a more substantial governmental interest for regulating
employee speech with a high degree of public concern.126 Thus, even if an
employee’s speech satisfies the public concern requirement under the
presumption for truthful testimony, employers will have to meet a lower

122. See Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of
Speech as a Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public
Employee Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 591 (2016) (explaining that an
employee called to testify is in an “impossible position, torn between” retaliation from his
employer and legal consequences for failing to testify truthfully).
123. Id.
124. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (concluding that courts must
look at the “content, form, and context” of public employee speech).
125. Butler, 920 F.3d at 655 (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176,
1181 (10th Cir. 2018)).
126. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 242 (2014) (“We have also cautioned, however,
that ‘a stronger showing [of government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s
speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.’” (quoting Connick, 461
U.S. at 152)).
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burden to justify disciplining an employee for speech that only minimally
relates to a matter of public concern. 127
Despite correctly rejecting a per se rule for truthful testimony, the Butler
court failed to consider the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the necessity for
truthful testimony and the weight it should carry in deciding whether
employee speech is of public concern. 128 If the Tenth Circuit had properly
considered a presumption that truthful testimony is of public concern and
weighed the context, form, and content of Butler’s speech in the manner the
Supreme Court dictated in Lane, it would have determined that his
testimony met the public concern requirement.129
B. Implementing a Broader Interpretation of Public Concern
If there is a reasonable basis for holding that a public employee’s sworn
testimony relates to a matter of public concern, courts should do so because
of the unique importance of this type of speech. 130 Public employee speech
can have personal significance and still be of public interest. This was the
case in Butler, where the welfare of children—an obvious topic of public
interest—was involved.131 Therefore, while the court was right in asserting
that Butler’s testimony was partly a personal matter, it failed to recognize
that it was also of interest to the public and “at its root a societal and public
issue.”132 Child custody hearings are publicly funded and part of the public
record, similar to sentencing hearings, which the Tenth Circuit has held to
be of public concern. 133 The commonality between these two types of
hearings lends further support to a finding that Butler’s testimony was on a
matter of public concern.
In an effort to protect the interests of the judicial system and those whom
the court compels to participate in the judicial process, courts should set a
high bar for employers who want to take adverse employment action
127. See id.
128. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 666 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 666–67 (“The majority does not cite a single case from this circuit in
which sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is so personal in nature as to overwhelm the
strong presumption . . . towards treating such speech as involving matters of public
concern.”).
130. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (discussing the unique
nature of courtroom testimony compared to other forms of speech).
131. See Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1182 (10th Cir. 2018)
(“Merely because speech concerns an issue of personal importance does not preclude its
treatment as a public matter.”).
132. Butler, 920 F.3d at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 666 (citing Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1181).
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against an employee on the basis of that employee’s sworn testimony. All
citizens bear the legal duty to testify truthfully in court proceedings,
regardless of employment status, and protecting the right to do so without
fear of retaliation whenever possible reflects the importance of this civic
duty. 134 Courts should always consider the context and form of speech—
especially when testimony is compelled—unless the content of the speech
has no plausible relation to the public interest.135
Implementing a broader interpretation of speech that meets the public
concern requirement and adopting a rebuttable presumption that truthful
testimony is of public interest would sufficiently protect public employees
without ignoring the government’s interest in regulating its employees’
speech. Under the Garcetti/Pickering balancing test, public employers have
to meet a lesser burden to justify disciplining an employee for speech that
has a lower degree of public concern.136 Thus, even with a more expansive
idea of what qualifies as a matter of public concern, courts can still fairly
balance the interests between a government employer and a public
employee.
VI. Conclusion
Sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding is a unique form of speech,
such that it deserves substantial First Amendment protections for public
employees. The special importance of this type of speech has created a
circuit split as to whether courts should adopt a per se rule that courtroom
testimony is automatically a matter of public concern. The Fifth and Third
Circuits, in adopting a per se rule, are not in line with the Supreme Court’s
mandate in Connick and Lane that courts should use a case-by-case
approach, considering the content, form, and context of employee speech to
determine if it is of public concern. However, circuits that have rejected a
per se rule, as the Tenth Circuit did in Butler, have not afforded enough
protection to public employee speech in the form of truthful testimony. For
courts to strike a proper balance between a public employee’s right to free
speech, they must consider both the importance of witness testimony for the
health of the justice system and a government employer’s interest in
regulating its employees’ speech.

134. Deloney, supra note 121, at 711 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
438 (1932)).
135. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014).
136. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

522

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:505

As this Note proposes, the most effective way to balance these
competing interests and safeguard public employees’ First Amendment
rights in a manner consistent with Supreme Court precedent is to adopt a
rebuttable presumption that courtroom testimony is of public concern.
Moreover, courts should expand the interpretation of what qualifies as a
matter of public concern to include, among other topics, speech like
Butler’s testimony because child welfare is of public concern. With the
approach advocated herein, courts can afford First Amendment protection
to sworn testimony whenever its content has some plausible relation to a
matter of public interest, while still allowing public employers to overcome
the rebuttable presumption by successfully arguing that the speech at issue
is wholly on a private matter.
Anna H. McNeil
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